In this paper we re-examine the German dominance hypothesis, as a way to assess whether the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe associated with EMU had been significant.
Introduction
Beginning on January 1st 1999, and following the adoption of a common currency (the euro) and the starting of the European Central Bank's operations, 11 European countries now form a monetary union (the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU). As it becomes obvious, EMU means the loss of monetary independence of the participating countries, which might be seen as a cost, at least at a first sight.
Things are not so simple, however. As it is well known, according to the so-called "inconsistent trinity" principle a fixed exchange rate, full capital mobility, and the independence of monetary policy, are not mutually compatible. And this situation roughly applied to the European economies before EMU, which shared a quasi-fixed exchange rate system (the European Monetary System, EMS), and especially following the elimination of capital controls after the Single European Act in 1990-92. This fact led to the countries participating in the EMS to realize that they were gradually losing the control of their monetary policies in favor of the Bundesbank, the central bank of Germany, i. e., the country presumed to act as a leader in the EMS. Hence, EMU could emerge as an economic response to that situation, on allowing those countries to regain some control over monetary policy thanks to the creation of an European Central Bank replacing the Bundesbank, in which they could have a vote (Wyplosz, 1997) .
In fact, a general consensus had emerged in Europe which would justify the previous argument, i. e., that the EMS had worked in an asymmetric way, with Germany assuming the leading role and the remaining countries passively adjusting to German monetary policy actions.
In its turn, these countries would have benefited from behaving in such a way, since they would have taken advantage of the firmly established anti-inflation credibility of the Bundesbank [see, e. g., Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) or Mélitz (1988) ]. This discussion ultimately lies in the socalled n-1 problem faced by fixed exchange rate systems, since there are only n-1 exchange rates among the n countries participating in an exchange rate agreement. Therefore, in such a situation, either one country becomes the leader and sets monetary policy independently (with the other countries following it), or all countries are allowed to decide jointly over the implementation of monetary policy (De Grauwe, 1997) .
The first empirical studies on the subject seemed to confirm the hypothesis of German dominance into the EMS [see, e. g., Giovannini (1987,1989) or Karfakis and Moschos (1990) ]. However, these conclusions were not confirmed in further research, most of it consisting of tests for Granger-causality between German and other countries' interest rates at a monthly or quarterly frequency [see, among others, Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) , von Hagen and Fratianni (1990) , Koedijk and Kool (1992) , Katsimbris and Miller (1993) , or Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis (1999) ]. In this way, a milder support for the hypothesis was found in the above quoted papers; namely, that the other countries' interest rates depended on the German ones, but also conversely, even though in a lower extent in terms of both size and persistence. Finally, results along these lines were also reported in some studies using high frequency (i. e., daily) data on interest rates [see Gardner and Perraudin (1993) , Henry and Weidmann (1995) and Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández (1997) ], so that it might seem that Germany would have played a special role in the EMS, although calling it "dominance" would be too strong.
In this paper we re-examine the German dominance hypothesis, as a way to assess whether the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe associated with EMU had been significant (which, in its turn, could be taken as an argument in favor of EMU itself). The empirical methodology makes use of Granger-causality tests between the monthly interest rates of Germany and all the countries participating at any time in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, with the sample period running until December 1998. This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following respects:
a) The sample period covers until just the eve of EMU, i. e., December 1998. This allows us to include the most recent events in European monetary history, such as the German reunification, the monetary turmoil at the end of 1992, the broadening of the EMS fluctuation bands in August 1993, and the rather quiet period leading to the birth of EMU. Regarding previous studies on the subject, those with a more recent sample period are Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis (1999) , who use quarterly data until the end of 1994, and Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández (1997) , who use daily data until February 1997.
b) The analysis is extended to all the countries participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS. So, unlike previous studies (with the only exception of Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández (1997) ), that consider only the founding members of the EMS (i. e., Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland), our analysis also includes those countries which later joined the ERM of the EMS (i. e., Spain, the UK, Portugal, and Austria). c) Granger-causality in a cointegration setting is properly tested. That is, an errorcorrection mechanism (ECM) is included into every equation to be estimated when cointegration is found, which allows us to distinguish between short-run and longrun Granger-causality 1 . Also, and following Katsimbris and Miller's (1993) suggestion, Granger-causality relationships between German and the other countries' interest rates have been investigated both in a bivariate and a trivariate setting, in order to avoid possible spurious results due to the omission of some relevant Granger-causality between them, the number of lags of the right-hand side variables is not constrained to be the same.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The econometric methodology of the paper is discussed in Section 2, and the empirical results are shown in Section 3. The main conclusions are presented in Section 4.
1 Katsimbris and Miller (1993) were the first to notice this point, usually overlooked in the available empirical studies on this subject.
Econometric methodology
As stated before, the econometric methodology used in this paper is based on Granger-causality tests (Granger, 1969) . As it is well known, the results from these tests are highly sensitive to the order of lags in the autoregressive process. An inadequate choice of the lag length would lead to inconsistent model estimates, so that the inferences drawn from them would be likely to be misleading. In this paper, we will identify the order of lags for each variable by means of Hsiao's (1981) sequential approach, which is based on Granger's concept of causality and Akaike's final prediction error criterion.
Suppose two stationary variables, X t and Y t , on which we would like to test for Grangercausality. Consider the models:
and then the following steps are used to apply Hsiao's procedure:
(i) Take X t to be a univariate autoregressive process as in (1), and compute its final prediction error criterion (FPE hereafter) with the order of lags i varying from 1 to M. Choose the lag that yields the smallest FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPE X (m,0).
(ii) Treat X t as a controlled variable with m lags, add lags of Y t to (1) as in (2), and compute the FPEs with the order of lags j varying from 1 to N. Choose the lag that yields the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the corresponding FPE as Recall that before it was assumed that X t and Y t were stationary variables. However, if they are integrated of order one (i. e., first-difference stationary) and are cointegrated, equations
(1) and (2) need to be amended to:
where z t is the ECM (Engle and Granger, 1987) . Notice that if X t and Y t are I(1) but are not cointegrated, the coefficient δ in equations (3) and (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. Now, the previous definitions of Granger-causality for stationary variables can be applied to the case of I(1) variables from equations (3) and (4). In particular, if To conclude, notice that the above procedure corresponds to the bivariate case. Testing for Granger-causality in the trivariate case requires amending the previous equations to:
where W t denotes the third variable, for the case in which X t , Y t , and W t are stationary; and, for the case in which the three variables are I(1) and cointegrated:
so that the relevant comparison is now between FPE X (m,0,p) and FPE X (m,n,p), and between FPE ∆X (m,0,p) and FPE ∆X (m,n,p), respectively; where (m,0,p) and (m,n,p) are the combinations of lags leading to the smallest FPE in each case.
Empirical results
The data used in this paper are the three-month interbank onshore interest rates, at a monthly frequency, of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, the UK, Portugal, Austria, and the US. The previous list includes all the European countries participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS, and coincides with that of the countries joining EMU from the outset, which the exceptions of Denmark and the UK, and the inclusion of Luxembourg and Finland 2 . The beginning of the sample period is March 1979 (i. e., when the ERM started to operate) for the founding members of the EMS (France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland), and the month of accession to the ERM for the newcomers:
June 1989 for Spain, October 1990 for the UK, April 1992 for Portugal, and January 1995 for Austria, with the data for Germany and the US adjusting accordingly in each case. The end of the sample is in all cases December 1998 (i. e., the last month before the starting of EMU), and all the data come from the Statistic Bulletin of the Bank of Spain.
As a first step of the analysis, we tested for the order of integration of the variables by means of the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. According to the results from both tests, shown in Table 1 , the null hypothesis of a unit root was not rejected in all cases, at the same time that the null of a second unit root was always rejected.
Next, we tested for cointegration between the German interest rate and the interest rates of the other European countries in our sample, both in a bivariate and trivariate setting, in the latter case including the US interest rate as an additional variable. Two tests were performed: the (cointegrating regression) augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Ouliaris tests. Both tests were computed using the residuals from the (bivariate or trivariate) cointegrating regressions estimated by the method proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) , robust to the presence of serial correlation and endogeneity bias.
The results of the cointegration tests appear in Table 2 . As can be seen, the only interest rates appearing to be cointegrated with the German ones in the bivariate case would be those of 2 Notice that Luxembourg, a founding member of the EMS, is not included in the sample since she already formed a monetary union with Belgium before EMU. Also, Finland, which participated in the ERM of the EMS since October 1996, is not included given the small number of observations available.
Austria and the Netherlands; whereas, in the trivariate case (i. e., when the US interest rates are included into the cointegration equation), cointegration is also found in the cases of Belgium, Denmark and Ireland. These results should not be too surprising since, as noticed by Caporale and Pittis (1995) , the integration of the financial markets of the EMS countries would had been a gradual process, leading to a slow convergence process of interest rates towards the German levels. Hence, cointegration should be expected only when full convergence had been achieved 3 .
Now, we are able to perform Granger-causality tests in a cointegration framework, and the results for the bivariate case are shown in Table 3 . German interest rates appear to Grangercause all the other EMS interest rates, the opposite being also true in all cases but those of Austria, Ireland, and the UK; bilateral causality is also found between German and US interest rates. Notice, however, that, when bilateral Granger-causality is found, the decrease in FPEs is greater when German interest rates are added to the equations explaining the other interest rates than in the opposite case (the exception being the US case). On the other hand, bilateral long-run causality would appear in the case of the Netherlands, whereas German interest rates would cause those of Austria in the long run, but not the other way round. These results would suggest that, although there would have been some degree of symmetry in the EMS, the influence of Germany on the other EMS countries would have been greater than the other way round.
Next, we turn to the trivariate case in Table 4 . Beginning with causality between German interest rates and those of the other EMS countries, the results, shown in part A) of Table 4 are quite similar to those in Table 3 . The only exception would be the bilateral Granger-causality now found for Austria; also, Danish interest rates do not appear to Granger-cause the German ones, even though the difference between FPEs in this case would be very small. Again, the German interest rates add more explanatory power to the equations explaining the other interest rates than in the opposite case. Regarding long-run Granger-causality, it would arise in a bilateral way for Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands; also, German interest rates would
Granger-cause those of Austria, and, more surprisingly, Irish interest rates would Granger-cause those of Germany, although only at a 10 per cent significance level.
3 Some evidence along these lines for the Spanish case can be found in Camarero, Esteve and Tamarit (1997) .
We have also tested for Granger-causality between the US interest rates and those of the EMS countries other than Germany, as well as between German and US interest rates, with the results appearing in parts B) and C) of Table 4 , respectively. As can be seen, the US interest rates would Granger-cause those of Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal, in the short run;
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland, in the long run; and Austria and Belgium, both in the short run and the long run. In its turn, the interest rates of Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK would Granger-cause the US interest rates in the short run. On the other hand, bilateral short-run Granger-causality is found between German and US interest rates in most cases (the exceptions being when the interest rates of Spain, Portugal, and the UK are included in the regressions), but no clear long-run Granger-causality is detected (other than that found from the US to Germany when the interest rates of Denmark are used).
Finally, we have also tested for structural change in all the estimated equations shown in performed for the interest rates of the EMS founding members, given the reduced number of observations available for the newcomers. As can be seen in Table 5 , the null hypothesis of no structural change is not rejected almost generally. The more relevant exception would be the French case, where a structural change in Granger-causality from Germany would be detected following the German reunification and the monetary turmoil at the end of 1992, both in the bivariate and trivariate models.
To summarize, bilateral Granger-causality has been found between the interest rates of Germany and the other countries participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS, the main exceptions being Ireland and the UK 4 . However, when bilateral Granger-causality is found, the increase in explanatory power is greater when German interest rates are added to the equations explaining the other interest rates than the other way round. Therefore, our results would point to a certain "leadership" or special role of Germany within the EMS, although we could not talk of 4
In fact, Artis and Zhang (1997) found that Ireland and the UK would have followed in recent years a different cyclical evolution as compared to the other European countries.
"dominance" in a strict sense. In particular, and according to the terminology introduced by Ireland and the UK), even though that relationship would have been stronger from Germany to the other countries than in the opposite way. Then, Germany would have played a certain "leadership" or special role in the EMS, although she would not had been strictly the "dominant" player.
Regarding the policy implications of the paper, these would provide some mild support to the hypothesis about EMU as an economic response to the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe in favor of Germany, especially after the achievement of full capital mobility in the first nineties (Wyplosz, 1997) . Also, the position of the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, and Portugal) faced to EMU does not seem to be quite different to that of the "core" European countries, at least in terms of the autonomy of their monetary policies. The same can be said for Denmark and the UK, two countries currently not in EMU; in fact, according to our results, the UK would have been (together with Ireland) the country the most "dominated" by German monetary policy actions. 
B) PHILLIPS-PERRON TEST
, and Z(tˆ α ) are the Phillips-Perron statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift, respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991). (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991). 
B) PHILLIPS-OULIARIS TEST
The test refers to the cointegrating-regression Z(tˆ α ) statistic on the Phillips-Hansen residuals. (ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are taken from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) . 
TABLE 3 GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS: BIVARIATE MODELS

n=5 ---YES
Notes: (i) m and n denote the lags for the dependent variable and the additional regressor, respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum number of lags tried has been 12. X and G denote every country in the first column of the table, and Germany, respectively. (ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the ECMs (in parentheses). 
Notes:
(i) X , G, and US denote every country in the first column of the tables, Germany and the US, respectively. (ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
